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Abstract: 
 Previous empirical research on variable pay systems have suggested that possible 
gains can come from paying for performance, but highlight the difficulty firms face in 
measuring performance. Using contracts signed in Major League Baseball’s free agent 
market, I find that over the 2010-2014 period, teams utilized variable pay schemes with 
players that were more productive or signaled greater risk, either in their contract terms 
or via overspecialization. However, not all forms of risk signaling were correlated with 
greater use of performance incentives, including age and proxies for injury history. These 
findings have significant implications for labor practices more broadly, as the high-
information environment of Major League Baseball can shed light on how principals 
behave when performance measurement costs are effectively eliminated.  
 
Introduction: 
 In January of 2011 Johnny Damon, an outfielder for the Detroit Tigers, signed a 
free agent contract with the Tampa Bay Rays. There are roughly one hundred free agent 
contracts signed every season, and his one year, $5.25 million deal didn’t seem to stick 
out  at first glance, but the details of Johnny Damon’s contract have a lot to teach us 
about baseball, and perhaps even more about labor economics more broadly. While most 
contracts observed in this period had performance incentives for plate appearance, 
innings pitched, winning awards, etc., Damon’s contract contained a unique performance 
incentive that stipulated his eligibility to gain $750,000 in bonuses based on the amount 
of fan attendance at Rays’ home games. The goal of this study is to utilize a case study, 
data-oriented approach in order to understand how, in situations where principals have 
access to highly detailed performance measures, MLB teams utilize contract incentives to 
make the most out of their investment in player salaries.  While Johnny Damon is 
certainly an anomaly, his case speaks to the variety of incentives that can and do exist in 
this environment. The Major League Baseball (MLB) collective bargaining agreement 
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effectively does not limit performance incentive negotiations at all when free agents 
contract with teams, and accordingly teams have the freedom to offer contracts with 
incentives that include body weight targets, specific provisions against injuries, and as 
Johnny Damon showed, even stadium attendance.   
 The objective of this research is not simply to understand how teams reward 
players who hit home runs versus those that steal bases, but to use (MLB) as a sort of 
naturally occurring experiment from which we can glean economically relevant insights 
about wider labor market topics. MLB offers us an example of a labor market where all 
firms and all labor units are aware of the performance of every other actor in the market, 
down to specific levels. Because of the level of information availability regarding 
performance, MLB is a laboratory that enables outside researchers like myself to analyze 
how principals and agents behave when measuring performance is not a restraint on 
decision making. Unlike analyzing salesmen at a range of insurance firms, for example, I 
can tell you exactly how many hits Johnny Damon had in 2011, how many home runs he 
hit in 2009, how many steals he had in 2012, etc. Understanding the relationship between 
hitting home runs and incentives that encourage excellent performance may be central to 
baseball teams, but knowing how employers with high levels of information contract 
their employees has implications for nearly every industry.  
 The MLB free agency market offers a labor market where performance incentives 
are utilized with enough frequency for us to be able to make some connections to 
performance pay more broadly. Over the five year signing period analyzed here (2010-
2014), 38.97% of free agent contracts contained some sort of performance-dependent 
bonus. With a total sample size of 661 contracts, and a total of 258 of those containing 
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the incentives, significant results were found in a number of areas regarding performance 
incentives.  Labor economics literature certainly has much to say on performance-pay 
schemes, but this is the first investigation of MLB in this regard. There is a certain degree 
of uncertainty that comes with uncharted territory, which I learned as some of my initial 
hypotheses failed to align with conclusions from data, but I believe this case study opens 
more avenues of research for the intersection of sports and labor economics, which I hope 
other scholars are willing to chase down.   
 
Background and Hypothesis Formation: 
The motivation for this research is to shed some light on possible alternatives to 
one of the central challenges to and questions facing modern organizations. Though the 
“principal-agent” problem was originally labeled by Jensen and Meckling in 1976, the 
tenuous relationship between ownership and employee self-interest is a seemingly 
unavoidable facet of the firm. In nearly any firm in any industry you can imagine, the 
interest of ownership and the interest of the employees do not always perfectly align, and 
this imbalance can lead to significant agency costs for the firm. (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) While it may seem strange that the search for answers to such a pressing economic 
question takes us to the world of professional sports, the abundance of contractual data 
and unique opportunities for performance measurement makes this research a highly 
logical case study. 
Performance measurement has long been highlighted as arguably the primary 
challenge facing firms that choose to institute incentive pay systems (Roberts, 2010), and 
MLB offers principals (owners/front offices) a nearly unmatched level of performance 
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measurement. A Study of the MLB labor market may be able to provide insights into how 
principals make decisions on variable pay contracting when information is highly 
accessible. As Lazear suggests, if measurement costs are sufficiently low, like we assume 
them to be in the MLB market, variable pay schemes are better at maximizing output 
(Lazear, 1995), so we should see a relatively high level of performance pay usage in 
MLB. While the initial impact of the study applies most directly to the sports world, a 
better understanding of how to design contracts to address the principal-agent problem 
has managerial implications across a wide variety of industries.  
 To begin this analysis, we must establish a background of contract theory, 
specifically as it pertains to incentive pay contracts and principal-agent issues. The core 
of contract theory addresses the basic problem defined in principal-agent theory, which 
seeks to remedy the misaligned self-interests of the principal (owners, shareholders, etc.) 
and employees, defined as agents. Consider an example from our industry: a player 
(agent) may not be exerting as much effort as he could at the end of a season in which his 
team has been eliminated from making the postseason. Nevertheless, it is still in in the 
interest of the principal (the owner) for that player to perform at maximum effort to 
maximize their value via ticket sales, merchandising, etc. This problem is especially 
salient in MLB where contracts are typically made for multiple years, so providing less 
than optimal effort in the second year of a five year contract might not negatively impact 
the player, this behavior certainly does not align with the interest of the ownership. This 
problem leads us directly to consider incentives, which “can limit divergences from [the 
principle’s] interest.” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) These divergences from the 
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principle’s interest can take the form of reduced effort, as described above, or by factors 
outside the player’s control like injury risk. 
 The contract as a whole is the most basic type of incentive, but a standard salary 
may not always be enough of a finely tuned incentive to induce complete cooperation 
with, and commitment to, the firm. The idea that “incentives matter” and that they are the 
primary means to motivate economic actors to exert effort and subsequently improve 
performance is nothing new in the field of economics. (Gneezy, 2011) Beyond the 
structure of the basic salary, which is the first form of incentivizing labor, encouraging 
sustained high levels of effort has been a focus of literature regarding pay-for-
performance contracts. The possible benefits of performance pay systems could be 
immense, considering that agency costs are becoming more and more recognized as a 
major challenge facing firms, especially large ones. (Posner, 2010) Certain studies have 
indeed found that productivity gains can be fairly substantial for firms that institute these 
kinds of systems, though the gains are not as simple to generate as it may seem. (Gielen, 
2008; Lazear, 2000) Incentives within organizations are built with the intention that they 
will encourage employees to work smarter and harder if there is the possibility for further 
financial reward that corresponds with higher productivity. (Roberts, 2010) This is not to 
say that incentives are some simple factor that firms can turn on and off in order to easily 
address agency costs, in fact, the specifics design of incentives has been shown to be a 
key determinant of their effectiveness. (Roberts, 2010; Kauhanen and Napari, 2012; 
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994)  
 As mentioned above, the reason that this paper focuses on MLB is that 
performance measures are much more accessible, both to management and to outside 
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researchers such as myself, than they would be in most firms. The implication for 
performance pay is influential, as much of the literature regarding the design of 
incentives suggests a central role of performance measurement in decision making. 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994; Roberts, 2010) As Gibbs suggests, “Performance 
measurement is perhaps the most difficult challenge in the design and implementation of 
incentive systems.” (Gibbs, 2009) Most economists would agree that incentives are 
powerful determinants of behavior, so designing well measured and accurately targeted 
incentives can be an invaluable tool for firms. On the other hand, strong (in terms of 
incentive value relative to salary) incentives that are misguided in their measurement can 
have powerful negative implications. (Roberts, 2010) Firms must also consider 
monitoring costs when deciding on how to monitor employee performance. (Barth et al, 
2008) Why is it that many firms have such a hard time determining the productivity of 
their employees? The simple answer is that, in many cases, there are a wide variety of 
actions that employees can take that contribute to productivity, and it is difficult for the 
firm to properly weight incentives on which contribute most to overall value of the firm. 
(Kerr, 1975) 
This idea is perhaps best described by Gibbons, who suggests an example where 
an agent is rewarded for task “p” and observes the wage function w=s+bp; where w is 
earned wage, s is base salary, and b is the bonus rate. The goal of the principal is to 
maximize “y,” which is overall output, but the goal of the agent is to maximize “p” 
because it that measure that contributes to the agent’s wage and not overall productivity. 
(Gibbons, 1998) The goal now for the principal is to decide on a measurement, “p,” that 
is as closely related as possible to the increase in overall output. Luckily for us, there are 
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a variety of measures that baseball analysts believe are closely tied to the overall output 
of the firm, namely; Wins Against Replacement, Total Wins Added, etc. Baseball offers 
us a unique opportunity to see how principals design incentives when the issue of 
performance measurement is less of a concern. Granted, there is still some debate as to 
how accurate these measures are with respect to measuring total contribution to wins, and 
if in fact teams are win maximizers as opposed to profit maximizers, but overall the 
performance measurement hurdle is considerably lower for baseball teams than it is for 
an average business.  
If we assume that baseball teams are interested in maximizing wins, and/or the 
profits that are typically associated with winning, and we have measurements that can tell 
us directly how players contribute to that end (where “p” is directly correlated with 
output), we must ask why baseball teams do not exclusively use high degrees of pay for 
performance incentives in their contracts. This idea leads us directly into the counter-
weight to incentives in classical agency theory: risk. Pioneered by Prendergast, the 
agency theory literature suggests that agents are risk averse, and in order to take on more 
risk via variable pay systems, the overall wage rate must be higher to account for the risk 
(Prendergast, 2002). If we again consider the w=s+bp basic model, our risk-averse agent 
demands a higher “b” value to take on the risk of lowering the value of a constant “s.” 
Prendergast also suggests, and the theory is then followed in subsequent literature, that 
risk increases with the uncertainty of the environment as it pertains to “p,” meaning that 
the agent will demand higher returns in cases where the agent has less control over the 
variance in “p.” Given the wide variety of factors that are outside of a player’s control, 
and that incentives are shown to be more effective when agents feel they have a real 
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ability to affect the outcome, we would expect risk-averse players to charge a hefty 
premium for taking on the immense risk of heavily performance-dependent contracts. 
(Kauhanen and Piekkola, 2006) 
Despite the risks that agents face by taking on performance-based contracts, the 
advantages could be powerful if the incentives are smartly designed. Lazear’s study, 
though a limited case study, showed an increase of 44% in output per worker. (Lazear, 
2000) When positive productivity effects for performance pay were reported, existing 
studies have often suggested that both the expected increase in motivation due to 
increased incentives played a role, as well as a self-sorting process where highly 
productive workers were drawn to the firms with greater opportunities for total 
compensation. (Gielen, 2010; Dohmen, 2011) Self-sorting certainly plays a role in 
determining the effectiveness of performance pay programs, especially when competition 
in the labor and product markets, such as in MLB, dominates. Studies have shown that 
market competition is positively associated with the use of performance pay schemes, 
and the constant competition of MLB certainly represents a highly competitive market. 
(Barth, 2008) Barth’s research also shows that performance pay schemes are positively 
associated with the educational level of workers, because “the quality and effort of high-
skilled workers have larger impacts of productivity than the quality and effort of other 
groups of workers,” and that “paying for performance has a greater effect on output for 
high than low-skilled workers.” (Barth, 2008) Given the incredibly high level of 
performance of MLB players and the razor-thin margins that separate wins and losses, 
Barth’s thesis suggests that teams could benefit greatly from paying for performance.  
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Hypotheses: 
 Throughout this paper the distinction developed by Lazear (1998) will be used to 
differentiate between two types of incentives: those dependent on employee input actions, 
and those dependent on the output of those employees. These two variations can be 
simply referred to as input and output incentives. The preceding research forms the basis 
for my following hypotheses regarding the use of performance incentives in MLB 
contracts: 
1. As a form of allocating risk to the agent and away from the principal, or 
encouraging high effort levels, performance-dependent bonuses will occur 
in situations of higher risk, including: 
a. Players with an injury history that has forced them to miss a 
significant number of games in past seasons 
b. Older players 
c. Players that are given  relatively long or high value contracts 
d. Players whose value is highly dependent on performance in a 
specific skill area, controlling for overall productivity. 
2. Highly productive players will be contracted under incentives more often 
than less productive players 
 
Hypothesis (1) is a basic extension of the central risk tradeoff that is discussed in 
agency theory. It is not difficult to understand the sub-sections of this hypothesis as 
situations of heightened risk. Parts (a), (b), and (d) all leverage the concern of teams that 
past productivity of players may soon decline via natural aging or sudden incapacitation 
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of ability, via injury or some such event. A history of significant injury was not easily 
accessible data, and would make an interesting extension of this research with more time, 
so proxies were developed to indicate a non-durable history. These include measures of 
variance in at-bats for hitters and the number of innings pitched compared to the 
positional average for pitchers. Part (d) deserves a bit more explanation, however. The 
basic rationale for this hypothesis is tied to the literature that suggests the possibility of 
pay-for-performance to promote perverse incentives, which is built with an assumption 
that there are many tasks that can provide value to the firm. (Gibbons, 1998; Kerr, 1975) 
Baseball players can take a wide variety of actions to be productive, and players that are 
specifically focused, and subsequently derive much of their value from a single skill, are 
less capable of undertaking all actions that can contribute to value. Subsequently, these 
players are less capable of remaining productive if their performance in their specialized 
area dips for one reason or another (injury, age, anomalously bad performance) and 
therefore it would make sense for teams to contract these kinds of players under 
incentives more often in order to protect themselves from this kind of risk. Part (c) is also 
fairly simple, as teams that make fixed investments in players are committing to a certain 
degree of risk by projecting a player’s value for such a long period or monetary 
investment (most often both).  
The second hypothesis follows from Barth’s research, which suggests that the 
rewards that firms can earn by encouraging higher effort levels for their most productive 
employees are greater than the rewards that can be gained from average employees. 
(Barth, 2008) Accordingly, we would expect these kinds of players to be contract 
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specifically under incentives that encourage excellent performance, as opposed to more 
input style incentives.  
 
Coding and Rationale: 
In this section I will describe how I chose the variable that I used, where that data 
came from, and how I combined the data into useful aggregates for use in this research.
 The core of this project is understanding performance pay and variable pay 
incentives, and the first step in the process was coding in the different kinds of incentives 
that teams can attach to free agent contracts. Teams can employ a wide range of 
incentives in their contract negotiations with players, and the restrictions on these 
bonuses are surprisingly limited. The league collective bargaining agreement, which is 
decided upon by the MLB Players Association (MLBPA) and the owners and applies in 
five year periods, does not have any significant restrictions on the kind of measures that 
can be used to determine bonuses. (MLB General Agreement, 2007, 2012) The only real 
restrictions arise from the nearly century-old MLB constitution and the normal restriction 
on general contract negotiations, which stipulate that incentives cannot be based upon the 
standing of the team and can only be based on the performance of the player. (MLB 
constitution, 1921) Beyond those restrictions, there are provisions that define how the 
bonuses are to be paid (at the end of the season, over a set number of years, etc.), but 
teams can effectively assign performance targets to any metric they want if both sides 
mutually agree on it and the base salary is above the league minimum. (MLB General 
Agreement, 2007, 2012) Given the wide range of performance incentives that teams can 
offer, this research will seek to categorize them into manageable types.  
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 Coding the performance targets falls into three categories: Output, Input, and 
some combination of the two, simply labeled Both. Output and Input categories can be 
defined as follows: Input incentives are those based on plate appearances, games played, 
innings pitched, starts made, injury occurrence, and weight targets. Output incentives are 
those based on All-Star appearances, gold gloves, MVP voting, batting titles, silver 
slugger awards, and Cy Young award voting. The only significant exception to these 
award winning conditions is the 2010 Johnny Damon stadium-attendance incentive 
mentioned in the introduction, which was coded into the excellence category. The Both 
category consists of player who had incentives from both the Input and Output groups, 
and those that had incentives based on games finished (more on this shortly). The coding 
of these incentives matches up well with the input/output designation used in Edward 
Lazear’s 1998 work to define the different types of pay mechanisms. We can think of 
input incentives like plate appearances similar to the way Lazear considers a typical 
laborer’s hours worked; in that, barring some outside force (like injury, for example), the 
agent has a high degree of control over the achievement of this incentive. Gold gloves 
and MVP awards, on the other hand, are much more closely tied to the outcome of an 
agent’s effort in the same way that we may analogize to a salesperson’s commissions. By 
simply showing up to the office every day the worker can control the input incentive, 
similar to a salesperson’s commissions, players need to achieve some output mark in 
order to earn output bonuses.  
 The rationale behind the coding lies in a personal knowledge of baseball and a 
rational approach utilizing the input/output framework. For example, appearance-based 
incentives like games played, innings pitched, etc. are certainly very different from 
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winning awards, by the distinction described in the previous paragraph, and have 
therefore been coded into the input category. I define these as input incentives because 
they are not necessarily designed to award a player for achieving an excellent level of 
performance, but instead to insulate the team from the risk of a player experiencing a 
significant injury or unexpected massive decline in ability for some other reason tied to 
their ability to input effort. With that said, it is worth noting that contract negotiations are 
a bilateral process where players may retain a good deal of bargaining power, both 
individually and as a collective represented by the MLBPA. There may be some 
characteristics of players, such as a higher level of confidence in their own ability, which 
may make them more likely to accept the risk. Interesting further research could certainly 
be done on the ways that players/agents decide to accept risk, though the focus of this 
paper is on team/principal decision making. On the other side, the output coded 
incentives are all tied to awards that are only given to players performing at an incredibly 
high level in comparison to the rest of the league (MVP, batting titles) or their positional 
peers (Cy Young, Gold Glove, Silver Slugger). The one outlier was for relief pitchers and 
the “games finished designation,” which is unique because, depending on the standing of 
a player, it can be either an incentive that is awarded for a significant increase in 
performance or one that functions in a similar way to appearance incentives. Specifically, 
if a player is a non-closer (the closer being the most high-leverage, most valuable relief 
pitcher on a team) who through excellent performance wins the job as the closer, and 
subsequently will finish more games than if he was still pitching in the seventh or eighth 
inning, then rewarding that player with a games finished bonus is a form of rewarding 
output excellence. On the other hand, if the player is already the closer, finishing games 
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is part of his basic job description, so hitting this target is very similar to a starting pitcher 
reaching a conservative innings target designed to protect the team from risk of injury.   
 The determination for a player’s position was standardized across my data sources 
in the following way: if a player recorded more than half of their appearances at a given 
position, they are coded into that position; if a player did not appear at one position for 
more than 50% of their games, they are coded into the position in which they made the 
most appearances; if a player only registered as a pinch hitter, they are coded as a 
designated hitter (<10 occurrences).  
 The determination for specialists was made to approximate roughly the top 10% 
of players specializing in a given skill at each position. Without utilizing a plate 
appearance minimum (so as not to exclude observed players) this top 10% came out to 
roughly ten players per position. There may have been slightly more players who 
registered a start in left field in a given season than registered a start at shortstop, but in 
order to standardize, I took the top ten players in each category per position. The 
shortstop that hits the tenth most home runs in a given season may not seem like a power-
hitting specialized labor unit, but a shortstop that ranks in the top ten at his position every 
year for five years certainly has proven to be a valuable contributor in an offensive 
category that is relatively underrepresented for comparable labor units. Without breaking 
down the leaders by position, the fifteenth or twentieth best power-hitting first baseman 
(a traditionally power-rich position) may have registered as being a more specialized 
player than a center fielder (a traditionally power-starved position) ranked much higher at 
his position, but that assumes a degree of interchangeability between these two labor 
units, which is highly unlikely. 
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With that said, the process for determining specialists was different with respect 
to the steals category. Instead of using a positional division, I chose to use the top 3% of 
all hitters in a given year to determine a specialist cutoff point. The critical factor that 
forced me to change the approach here was the fact that certain positions just don’t steal 
bases nearly at all. For example, if I were to use the same top-10 approach for catchers in 
2014, the maximum would have been four steals, with nine catchers recording more than 
one. With the home run hitters, ties for tenth place resulted in me including both players 
(if the 10
th
 most home runs for left fielders was 18 and two players hit 18, both were 
given a specialist point), but if this approach had held for the 2014 catchers fifteen 
players would have earned a specialist point for stealing bases despite stealing just one 
base all season! These catchers certainly didn’t fit the mold for speed specialists, so I had 
to change the approach. The top-10 strategy effectively provided the top 10% at each 
position, but when I eliminated the positional designation, the 10% steals mark for all 
players who registered an at bat was less than ten steals. We typically don’t think of a 
player with eight steals as being a speedster, so I had to change the cutoff to get to 
players who registered, depending on the season, between seventeen and twenty steals. 
This definition fits much more closely with players that we would consider to be speed 
specialists. Only one catcher made the grade here, with Russel Martin’s 2008 season 
coming in at eighteen steals. No other catcher recorded more than twelve steals in any 
season from 2008-2014. 
The skills chosen; home runs and steals, are meant to isolate players who possess 
a uniquely excellent skill at one facet of the game (power, speed), and to imply that 
specializing in one of these skills has a different effect on contracting than a player that 
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may excel at a more common skill (hits, runs, etc.). For each category, a player who 
made the specialist cutoff is given a point for each season they make this group. For 
example, if a player is in the specialist group in home runs three times over the 
observation period and in the steals specialization once, that player receives a three 
specialization score in home runs, a one in steals, and a four as the total. This is meant to 
imply that a player who consistently hits home runs at a high rate is viewed differently 
than one who has an anomalous year and sneaks into the top ten once over a five year 
period. This may bias the scales against younger players, but what we want to understand 
is what kinds of past performance influence decisions, and having more past performance 
to draw on is certainly a fair way for teams to evaluate players.  
 The process for finding these specialists amongst the pitchers took a slightly 
different shape. The data available for pitchers does not provide quite as many 
opportunities for the same sort of breakdowns that I used for the hitters, so I decided to 
focus on one particular kind of specialist: the “power pitcher.” Power pitchers, in baseball 
terms, are players that typically earn a higher portion of their outs via striking out hitters, 
as opposed to pitchers that excel by pitching to soft contact and induce a lot of ground 
balls, for example. Typically, this sort of pitching is associated with high velocity, and it 
would be an interesting extension of this research to investigate the connection between 
velocity and incentives, but for this analysis strikeout were used as a measure of this kind 
of specialist. Unlike the hitters, positional adjustments were much easier to make, as 
pitchers fall into only two primary categories: starting and relief pitchers.  
 Because of the simpler positional differences, I decided against using the same 
specialist score framework that I utilized for the hitters, instead opting for a more 
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continuous measure of specialization. The degree of specialization in a given skill, 
strikeouts are compared to innings pitched and earned run average (ERA) here, is shown 
continuously by the amount of that statistic above the positional average that a player 
produces in a given year. Suppose in one season relief pitchers average forty-five 
strikeouts and a given pitcher records sixty strikeouts. That pitcher will have a fifteen in 
the data column for strikeouts above average for that season. In this way, pitchers that 
continuously exceed the average for their position are continuously scaled as specialists.  
 
Data Sources: 
 The data used in the project was based on the Lahman Database, courtesy of Sean 
Lahman, but used many sources to generate my full dataset. Lahman’s work gave me 
data for all of my seasons of interest (2014-2008) on individual player statistics, player 
salaries, positional appearances, and many others. As a disclaimer applying to potential 
bias issues, it is worth noting that the salary data in the Lahman database is reported via 
the MLBPA. While the salary data is not critical to my results (I relied more on contract 
value data than yearly salary), it is worth noting here for disclosure’s sake. I utilized a 
matching process using player id codes and player names to combine the raw data from 
the Lahman database with data from Baseball Reference, Fangraphs.com, and ESPN to 
address my variable of interest. Specifically, Baseball Reference helped me fill in some 
of the holes in the Lahman database, as well as providing the leaders for yearly statistics 
like home runs, steals, strikeouts, etc. Fangraphs was used for their WAR calculations 
and projections. ESPN gave me yearly lists of all free agents with major league service 
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time, the number of seasons and value of the contracts they signed, and the age at the date 
of signing said deals.  
 
Initial conclusions from descriptive statistics: 
 In this section I will run through some of the descriptive statistics of the data and 
offer some initial results that can be seen through simple descriptive measures. The 
dataset presented here describes MLB players who negotiated contracts as free agents 
from those following the 2010 season to those following the 2014 season. These 
contracts, because of their nature as in the free agent market, were negotiated on an open 
labor market where players were able to contract with any team, meaning these data do 
not include arbitration signings, rookie signings, or extensions (which can only be 
negotiated with the current team). The only contract signings reported here are for players 
who had previously registered an at bat or inning pitched in the major leagues, so though 
some former major league players do appear in this dataset when they sign minor-league 
contracts, minor league free agents do not. (Also, this dataset does not include foreign 
players who sign with MLB teams).  
 The total number of observations, 661, represents contracts negotiated between 
hundreds of players and negotiated with every one of the league’s thirty teams. This is 
not to say that all teams are equal, as some teams were considerably more active in the 
free agent market than other teams. For example, the New York Yankees signed thirty-
five free agents over this period, while other teams like the Oakland A’s signed only 
thirteen free agents over this period. There is a wide breadth of literature in the 
economics of sports on competitive balance, market size, free agency, and a wide variety 
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of topics in that vein, but that is not the focus of this paper. It is worth noting, however, 
that teams can take very different approaches to build their rosters with respect to the free 
agent market, so all of the models developed in this research control for differences in 
each of the thirty teams.  
 The focus of this research is not the number or distributing of free agent contracts, 
but the incentives that may come attached to those contracts. The basic descriptive 
statistics with respect to incentives are as appear in Table 1. As previously mentioned, the 
kinds of incentives have been coded into categories by the nature of the incentivized task. 
(See: Data Description; Coding and Rationale) Over the whole period, the percentage of 
contracts negotiated that contained some sort of performance incentive was 38.97%. 
Broken down with more detail, 7.70% of the total number of contracts contained what 
I’ve categorized as “Output” incentives, 18.88% fell into the “Input” category, and 
12.39% contained both types or utilized a game’s finished measurement for bonuses. 
 One key element of the free agent market that must be mentioned here is that the 
behavior of teams does not have any mandatory effect on the behavior they may 
undertake in the following signing period, especially with respect to incentives. Because 
the market is essentially reset, and the labor units change almost completely from year to 
year, we must understand that each negotiating period is unique, as evidenced by the 
massive differences in the use of incentives from year to year. The use of incentives by 
signing period varied from 27.90% following the 2011 season to more than twice that 
percentage a year later. Following the 2012 season, an astonishing 56.99% of contracts 
negotiated over the signing period contained some kind of incentive. I must admit that I 
do not have a compelling theory as to why the swings in contract incentives are so wide, 
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and it may well be a good avenue for future research to examine free agency periods as 
unique laboratories of labor negotiation, but for now, that question will have to wait. 
 Table 2 shows the use of incentives broken down by team, which highlights the 
varied nature of the teams that come to the negotiating table on the employer side. The 
measurements presented show the percentage of all free agent contracts awarded by a 
given team during the five year period that contained some type of performance based 
incentive. The percentage of contracts that contain performance incentives varied from 
under 10% (White Sox, Blue Jays) and pushed upwards of 70% at the other extreme 
(Twins). Teams are often controlled by a small group of individuals that make up what is 
typically called the front office, consisting of the team owner(s), president, business 
executives, and most importantly, the general manager (GM). Given the massive amount 
of decision making power that a few individuals may have in MLB organizations, it may 
be that certain GM’s have their own rationales for offering or not offering performance 
incentives, which certainly is part of the variability in usage shown here.  
Some of the most interesting observations that I was able to make from the 
descriptive statistics came from comparing how performance incentives were used in 
different positional groups. For the purposes of the research here I broke down the 
positions as seen in table 3: one for each defensive position, one for starting pitchers, one 
for relief pitchers, and one for the designated hitter. It is worth noting that designated 
hitters are only available positions for players in the American League, meaning that half 
of the teams in MLB do not employ a full-time designated hitter. It is worth noting that 
certain positions were severely lacking in the free agent market over the past few seasons, 
namely center fielders (10) and shortstops (28). It appears that teams are more inclined to 
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acquire shortstops and center fielders via the amateur draft, and those that they do draft 
(or trade for) are often given contract extensions before they reach the free agent market. 
This is perhaps tied to a perception of heightened value at the position, as both are 
labeled as “premium defensive positions” in baseball circles, meaning that the benefit of 
a good defensive center fielder outweighs the benefit of a good defensive right fielder, for 
example.  
 Despite a low volume of observations with respect to certain positions, we can 
draw some interesting observations from the use of performance incentives based on 
position. One interesting difference is between starting and relief pitchers, who are 
contracted with input performance provisions 30.1% and 12.9% of the time, respectively. 
The difference between the two (p=0.0004) suggests that teams are less willing to take on 
extra risk when it comes to starting pitchers than they are for relief pitchers, subsequently 
allocating a greater degree of risk to the starting pitchers. One possible reason for this is 
there may be a greater variance in the performance of the starting pitchers compared to 
the relief pitchers, which holds true when looking at WAR (Wins Against Replacement, 
calculated by fangraphs). The variance in WAR of relief pitchers who signed free agent 
contracts over the given period is the lowest of any position, at 0.286, while the 
performance of starting pitchers was considerably more variable, as evidenced by their 
2.643 variance over the same period. (WAR measurement taken in year prior to signing) 
It is also worth noting that while the variance in WAR was fairly high for starting 
pitchers, only shortstop was higher when excluding the DH, the average WAR for players 
over this period was the highest for starting pitchers, suggesting that the risk may also 
come with significant rewards for teams. This corresponds to the large difference 
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between the two groups specifically with respect to the input performance incentives, 
where 30.70% of starting pitchers signed this type of contract, compared to only 12.87% 
for relief pitchers (p=0.0004).  
 While starting pitchers offered the highest reward, at least according to WAR, the 
right field positional group claimed the highest usage of performance incentives at 
58.82%. Why specifically right fielders were contracted under variable terms so often is 
an interesting question, and certainly one that could lead to interesting future research, 
especially since the closest positional comparison (left field) was nearly twenty 
percentage points away in terms of incentive usage (39.47%, t=0.0639). Right fielders did 
not hold the top spot in WAR averages across position players, and their distributing 
between the types of incentives was relatively similar to the other positions, though 
elevated.  
 
Results and Analysis: 
Result 1: Incentives and Contract Value 
 Figure 1 shows the results of the first regression of the choice to adopt 
performance incentives, controlling for position, season, and age. The use of performance 
incentives is positively correlated with the total value of the contract. (See Table 4, 
Model 1) The positive correlation between these two variables suggests that when teams 
agree to pay a larger sum of money over the course of a contract, they are more inclined 
to pass along some of the risk to the other party. This follows logically from an 
understanding of risk, as agreeing to a high-value contract is certainly a risk for a team to 
take on because there is effectively no insurance that a player will remain as productive 
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as they imagine him to be at the time of signing. It thus follows that teams would want to 
allocate some risk to the other party instead of bearing all of the risk of that labor unit 
losing significant value over the fixed length of the contract.  
 The coefficient on value, converted into millions for simpler understanding, is 
0.002, significant at 0.1%. (Table 4) This statistic may seem small, but when you 
consider the massive values that teams can offer in the modern free agent market, it 
becomes quite significant. Consider for example the largest value contract awarded 
during this period: the $250,000,000, eleven year deal that Albert Pujols signed with the 
Anaheim Angels following the 2011 season. While I understand that he represents the 
extreme, purely based on the small coefficient tied to value, he is 49.8 percentage points 
more likely to have incentives in his contract than is a player who signs a one million 
dollar contract. Not all players are receiving deals of this magnitude, and most of those in 
this sample are not, but it certainly appears that when players do get these kind of 
contracts, teams are very adamant about allocating even a small amount of risk to these 
type of players. 
 Interestingly, it appears that the vast majority of the correlation between 
incentives and value is tied up in the use of output incentives, as opposed to input 
incentives. The coefficient on value (again in millions) on the use of output based 
incentives is .003, Significant at 0.1%, slightly higher than it was for incentives as a 
whole. On the other side, there is a statistically (at 5%) significant negative relationship 
between the use of input incentives and the total value of a contract. What this seems to 
suggest is that teams are not as concerned with the possibility that a player receiving a 
high value deal will become completely worthless (via significant injury, for example), 
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but that they are paying for an all-star caliber player and the player should be paid less if 
they lose this premier differentiation. Essentially, teams are taking on so much risk that 
they want to protect against small drops in value. The negative correlation with input 
incentives is likely linked to the power of these incredibly valuable labor units, who are 
likely to feel insulted by a contract that protects a team from the possibility that the player 
is demoted to the minor leagues, which would negate a bonus for plate appearances, 
innings pitched, etc.  
The same holds true for the correlation between incentive use and the number of 
years agreed upon in a contract. (See Table 4, Model 2)The coefficient attached to the 
number of years contracted and the use of incentives is 0.034, significant at 5%. This 
value implies that for each additional year in a contract, a player becomes 3.4 percentage 
points more likely to have performance incentives included in his contract. For example, 
we can return to Albert Pujols and his massive deal. On the basis of length, his eleven 
year contract is thirty-four percentage points more likely to include incentives than a 
player who signs a one year deal. This again follows very logically in the same way that 
the correlation with value did, suggesting that lengthy contracts place high amounts of 
risk on teams, who subsequently look to divert some of that risk to the employee. What’s 
more, the same pattern holds that excellence based incentives are even more strongly 
correlated with contract length (0.052, significant at .1%) and that input incentives are 
negatively correlated with the overall length of a contract (-.026, significant at 10%). The 
negative correlation with respect to input incentives is a puzzling finding, and though we 
may be able to conjecture at an explanation tied to employee bargaining power, more 
research into this connection would certainly prove interesting. Despite the lack of a truly 
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satisfying explanation to this result, the different directions of correlation implied by the 
coefficients help us paint a picture of what type of players receive what type of 
incentives: players that are valued more highly are more likely to receive output-based 
incentives than lower value players, who are more likely to receive input incentives in 
their contracts.  
These results offer some evidence in support of, and in contradiction to, 
hypothesis (1). Though it is used only as a control in these models, age does not appear to 
have a significant impact on the use of performance incentives. This result, which 
contradicts hypothesis (1b), is persistent across nearly all of the models developed in this 
research, the variety of variables included in the models providing a relatively robust 
check to this lack of correlation. On the other hand, part (c) of hypothesis (1) seems to be 
supported by the data. The positive correlations between output incentives and contract 
value/commitment described above lend support to part (c).  
 
Result 2: Incentives and Specialization 
 Regression analysis also revealed a correlation between players with specialized 
skills and the use of contract incentives. There appears to be a positive relationship 
between a player having a special skill and the use of contract performance incentives, 
according to Table 5. This relationship held for both pitchers and hitters, and the results 
for both positional groups were obtained entirely separately in order to avoid any 
contamination (Table 6, Table 7). As previously mentioned, the specialization process is 
meant to identify players who are uniquely skilled at one facet of their duties. For hitters, 
steals and home runs were chosen as these specialized skills. For pitchers, the approach 
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was slightly different, as just strikeouts were chosen as the primary specialization with 
the goal of highlighting what the baseball community would tab “power pitchers.” In 
both of the models presented these specialization statistics appear alongside less 
specialized measures (innings pitched for pitchers and at-bats for hitters), as well as 
measures of variance for all the statistics, in order to control for anomalous seasons and 
opportunity volume. All models presented include controls for the signing team, player 
age, and season.  
 The results with respect to specialization appear to support Hypothesis (1d), 
which suggests that highly specialized players will be contracted under performance 
incentives more often. There are many nuances to this claim, which will be discussed in 
detail below, but the overall trend appears to support this hypothesis. Also worth noting, 
Hypothesis (1a) was not supported in these results, as the proxies developed for injury 
history (high variability in appearance statistics, appearances below average) did not 
show any significant correlation with incentive usage.  
  
Result 2.1: Incentives and Specialization; Hitters 
 The central result of the tests for specialization with respect to hitters is that the 
use of incentives is positively associated with labor units that specialize in home runs, but 
not with those who specialize in stealing bases. These specializations are defined in detail 
in the Coding and Rationale section. For the first kind of specialists, we can generally 
refer to them as power hitters, while the second group can be defined as base stealers. As 
evidenced by Table 5, it appears that teams in general contract specialist players with 
performance incentives more often than non-specialists, as evidenced by the positive 
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correlation between incentive use and the total specialist score. (.03, significant at 10%) 
This positive correlation suggests that for every time a player rates in the specialist 
category for a season, they are three percentage points more likely to sing a contract with 
performance incentives. For a player who has placed in the top ten power hitters at his 
respective position for five years, he could expect at fifteen percentage point increase in 
the likelihood of receiving an incentivized contract. Keep in mind that these results 
control for the standard fixed effects of position, age, and signing team, as well as 
controlling for the value of the contract. This means that these results are not picking up a 
positive correlation with respect to specialization just because these specialist players are 
valued more highly, but that there is something unique about these specialist players, 
beyond their total productivity, that alters the way teams contract them. To understand 
this rationale, we have to dig past the total specialist rating and into the individual 
measures of steals and home runs.  
 There is evidence for a positive correlation between the use of incentives and 
players that specialize in hitting home runs, but not for base stealers. According to Table 
6, a higher specialist score in the home run category is positively correlated with the use 
of incentives, while a higher specialist score in the steals category is not. The coefficient 
of .0395 on the home run specialist score, significant at 10%, indicates that for each 
previous season in which the player was in the power hitters category, they are roughly 
four percentage points more likely to have performance incentives in their contract. 
Steals, on the other hand, are not close to showing any sort of statistical significance, as it 
appears base stealing does not have an incredibly significant effect on team decision 
making in this regard. To develop a hypothesis as to why this difference exists between 
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how teams contract these two kinds of specialists, we must turn to one of the statistics 
initially included for control purposes in this test: the variance of these two measures.  
 The difference in variance between home runs and steals for this sample leads to 
the following hypothesis: teams are more likely to include performance incentives when 
contracting with power hitting specialists because there is more variability in home runs 
than there is in steals. Because these kinds of specialist players derive so much of their 
value from excelling at a particular skill, any sort of reduction in their performance at that 
skill would significantly reduce their overall value. Therefore, it is not surprising to find 
that the higher use of performance incentives for power hitters matches up with a higher 
variance in home run hitting, compared to the variance in base stealing. (Var(home 
runs)=35.97, Var(steals)=21.56) This result implies that teams are cognizant of the 
variability in these specialized tasks, and correspondingly try to protect themselves from 
the risk associated with players dependent on these more variable tasks.  
 
Result 2.2: Incentives and Specialization; pitchers 
 The results found among the hitters sample with respect to specialization and 
incentives were similar to those found in the pitching sample. As mentioned in the coding 
and rationale section, the degree of specialization for pitchers was computed on a 
continuous grade by comparing yearly results to positional averages. With respect to 
specialization, the power pitchers group, defined by high strikeout totals, did show a 
positive correlation with incentive use, according to Table 7. For every ten strikeouts 
above the positional average that a pitcher recorded he was five percentage points more 
likely to be under a contract that included performance incentives. The result was 
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significant at the five percent level. Interestingly, there was no statistically significant 
correlation between the use of incentives and pitchers that register an above average 
amount of innings pitched. This seems to follow the results from the hitters, suggesting 
that there is something special about the strikeout skill that makes teams concerned about 
performance changes. Perhaps there is a connection with the perceived connection 
between strikeouts and velocity mentioned above, but further research would be needed 
to make a definitive claim on this connection.  
 It is also worth noting that there exists a negative correlation between relative 
ERA and the use of incentives, with pitchers that allow fewer runs being contracted under 
incentives more often.  The coefficient on ERA was shown to be -0.0696, significant at 
5%, suggesting that for every run a pitcher shaved off his ERA he would be about seven 
percentage points more likely to be contracted with performance incentives. Preventing 
runs is the most central job of a pitcher, so it is unreasonable to call this a specialized 
skill, but in this case we must consider the magnitude. The significant of taking a full run 
off a pitcher’s ERA is incredibly large, as a pitcher with a 3.50 ERA is a solid contributor 
that might be the third best starting pitcher on his team, while a pitcher with a 2.50 ERA 
is likely one of the best in the league and has a legitimate chance at competing for a Cy 
Young award in many years. While ERA might have statistical significance, it is likely 
tied to the fact that players who have exceedingly high ERA numbers will likely be 
excluded from any sort of excellence incentive, as shaving off so many runs is so 
unlikely, subsequently weighing down the high-ERA pitchers with artificially low levels 
of incentive use.  
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 The results regarding innings pitched surprised me, especially with respect to the 
input subcategory of incentives. I expected to find a correlation between a pitcher that 
threw a below average amount of innings and/or had a higher variance in innings and the 
use of incentives, but the data does not bear that out. This result appears to contradict the 
claim made in hypothesis (1a), as we would expect injury prone players to pitch a below-
average number of innings and to have a higher variance in innings pitched. This result 
appears to be consistent with the hitters positional group as well, as the variance in at-bats 
was not correlated with any sort of incentive usage.  
When controlling for the standard set of fixed effects, as well as value, I did not 
find any significant positive correlation between innings pitched and the use of 
incentives; output, input, or otherwise. The one statistically significant connection that 
did come out of the innings pitched variables was not in the input category, but rather a 
negative correlation with excellence incentives. Though puzzling, the data showed that 
players who pitched a higher amount of innings were in fact less likely to be contracted 
under excellence incentives than those with fewer innings. This result pushes counter to 
our understanding of the positive correlation between contract value and these kind of 
incentives. Previous tests (See Table 4, Model 1) showed that value was positively 
correlated with the use of output based incentives, and we would expect pitchers that 
pitched more innings to be valued more highly, so it would follow that pitching an above 
average number of innings would be positively correlated with excellence incentives. 
Oddly, that second assumption is not supported by the data, as Table 8 shows a negative 
correlation between innings pitched above average and contract value. Why are pitchers 
that pitch more innings being valued lower than their lesser used counterparts? It is 
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certainly an interesting question for further research, but one possibility lies with the 
relief pitchers, who make up 63% of the pitchers contracted over this period. For relief 
pitchers, the most valuable are those that pitch the innings with the highest importance, 
not those that pitch the highest number of innings. A relief pitcher that throws an above 
average number of innings is likely what would be called a long-relief pitcher, who is 
typically a starting pitcher that didn’t make the top five spots for starters and was 
relegated to be a relief pitcher that soaks up inning when the game isn’t especially close. 
These low-leverage pitchers are certainly not valued at the same level as closers, those 
that pitch the highest leverage inning at the end of a close game. Therefore, one possible 
explanation for this quandary is that, for relief pitchers, the most valuable pitchers in fact 
throw fewer innings and the low-value pitchers throw more. 
 
Result 3: Player Productivity and Incentive Use: 
 Hypothesis 2 suggests that, following previous literature by Barth (2008), players 
who are more productive will be contracted under incentives more often than less 
productive players. Table 9 show some support for this hypothesis, where the WAR of a 
player’s previous season is positively correlated with incentive use. Before diving into 
the regression analysis, a quick note on WAR. An acronym for Wins Against 
Replacement, WAR is designed to represent the overall production of a player as it 
pertains to creating wins for his team. The WAR data presented here is courtesy of 
fangraphs.com, one of the leading sabermetrics sources. Though WAR is calculated 
slightly differently depending on the source, the differences are typically small, and as a 
measure for total productivity I believe it to be the best statistic for this purpose.  
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 The coefficient on WAR with respect to incentive use is 0.0349 (significant at 
5%), which indicates that an increase of one win makes a player about 3.5% more likely 
to be contracted under performance incentives. The models in Table 5 also show that 
WAR is not correlated with the use of input incentives, which is consistent with previous 
results regarding the differences between the types of incentives and contract values (See 
Table 4 Model 1). For the output-type incentives, the correlation was highly significant 
(at 0.01%) though the coefficient was slightly less, coming in at 3.08% for each extra win 
created. Despite the slightly lower coefficient, the significance of this positive coefficient 
furthers the notion that teams understand the higher returns that can be garnered by extra 
incentives for highly productive players. 
 
Conclusions and Extensions: 
 The research presented here is by no means definitive, but rather the first step into 
what I believe to be an under-analyzed intersection of labor and sports economics. My 
investigation into pay-for performance in MLB produced some interesting, statistically 
significant, results in a number of areas, but also highlighted previously unseen 
connections that were not researched as part of the central thread of this paper. It is my 
wish that more scholars will see the value of the world as sports as a possible laboratory 
for economic research, perhaps investigating why contracting behavior (in this case as it 
pertained to performance incentives) varied so significantly from year to year. Despite 
the many questions that my research has raised, I still was able to draw some noteworthy 
conclusions that have significant implications for performance pay research in a broad 
sense.  
36 
 
 One of the most interesting results that I discovered in this research was how 
many of my initial hypotheses did not come out through the data. Hypothesis (1), which 
suggested that teams that take on riskier players will tend to allocate some of that 
heightened risk to players via performance incentives, was supported in the data on some 
counts, but not all. . Parts (a) and (b) were both shown to have no significant correlation 
with the use of incentives; suggesting that teams do not take into account the age and 
injury history of a player when crafting performance incentives. This is not to say that 
teams did not take these factors into account at all when contracting these players, 
because as Table 8 shows, age did have a significant negative effect on the value of the 
contract, at least for pitchers. 
Two elements of risk-allocation highlighted in this hypothesis did come through 
in the data, however, suggesting that performance incentives may be used for this 
function in some cases, but not all. Both models in Table 4 show a positive correlation 
between risk-allocation to players and the value teams stand to lose on poorly performing 
or injured players. The positive correlations between incentive use and contract value, 
and between incentive use and the length of contracts, lend support to the risk tradeoff 
described in classical agency theory. (Prendergast, 2002) Logically, firms that take on 
risk by offering fixed term contracts would jump at the opportunity to put some of that 
risk on the agent via performance based pay. It appears that the market is willing to build 
in the risk of age and injury history into a player’s base salary, but teams are willing to 
offer higher value contracts individually if they can trade off some of that risk back to the 
agent.  
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The second significant finding with respect to risk and incentive use came via the 
investigation of specialization. The results in Table 6 indicate that players who specialize 
in a highly variable skill (hitting home runs, for example) are more likely to be contracted 
under performance incentives. The heightened risk level that comes from players that are 
less well-rounded certainly seems to be a factor in team decision making, even when 
controlling for the total value of those players. Interestingly, this trend appears to be 
consistent across both hitters and pitchers, as pitchers were contracted under incentives 
more often when they were more specialized in the strikeout skill and hitters received 
performance dependent deals when they specialized in the home run skill.  
The second hypothesis, which suggested that highly skilled players were going to 
be contracted under incentives more often than lower quality players, seemed to be 
supported in the data. The first way that this result appeared was through the positive 
correlation with contract value, as the skill of the player is obviously connected to the 
value of the contract in a competitive labor market. As Table 9 shows, incentive use was 
also positively correlated with the WAR of the player in the previous season. There are 
certainly valid criticisms one can make of WAR, but few would disagree that WAR at 
least approximates the skill of a player. This follows from Barth’s research, which 
suggests that principals have more to gain by encouraging performance at higher skill 
levels. (Barth, 2008)  
The question that plagues many studies of sport economics is: “so what?” Why 
should anyone outside of the small group of people that actually make decisions for 
baseball teams care that player who hit more home runs are contract under performance 
incentives more often? That small group should certainly care, though I suspect they 
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already know, but I believe the extensions of this research could hold significant 
implications for labor economics across industries. Each one of the proposed hypotheses 
tells us something about how firms behave in a competitive labor market where 
information about employee performance is near-perfect for all actors in the market. 
Stated that way, it is easy to see how this research can have wider implications, and if the 
gains from this type of contracting can be as productive as authors like Lazear suggest, 
the gains for industry could be immense. (Lazear, 2000) 
In the MLB laboratory, we were able to see that firms use a combination of basic 
salary and performance based pay to control for employee productivity risk. Some 
factors, like age and injury history, contributed to a reduction in base salary. This seems 
to indicate that certain characteristics of employees are taken by all actors in the market 
to be significant indications of risk, prompting a lower base salary. However, other 
indicators of risk like excessive specialization and the length of the commitment were 
taken into account via variable pay schemes. This may indicate that firms would be more 
likely to contract a sales staff under performance incentives than their accounting 
department because the productivity of the salespeople would likely be more variable 
than the accountants. These results can tell us a great deal about how well-informed firms 
behave, utilizing a combination of market-accepted salary reductions and performance 
based pay to protect themselves from risk.  
We can also see, following from the second hypothesis, that firms are likely 
aware of the greater gains that can be made from contracting highly productive workers 
under performance incentives. Very few firms have employees as productive as Mike 
Trout (the centerfielder for the Anaheim Angels, one of the most productive players in 
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baseball), but Mike Trout and his contract seem to indicate that encouraging the top 
salesperson to be a little more productive can pay greater dividends, something that many 
firms can certainly make use of.  
The conclusions that I have made here are a first step into this field, opening the 
door for further research in this area. The results that I have discovered can have an 
impact in a wide range of industries, and should be strongly considered in MLB 
contracting. Now I just have to hope that other scholars continue down the path I have set 
out, and that maybe someone drops this on the desk of A.J. Preller, the general manager 
of my hometown San Diego Padres. 
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Tables and Figures: 
 
Table 1: Incentive use by year and type 
This table shows basic summary statistics for the percentage of contracts in each year that 
contained the different types of performance incentives. 
 
 
 Output Input Both Total 
2010 4% 17% 10% 31% 
2011 5% 10% 12% 28% 
2012 12% 22% 24% 57% 
2013 8% 22% 8% 38% 
2014 12% 27% 11% 51% 
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Table 2: Average use of incentives by team 
This table shows the percentage of free agent contracts over the given five year period 
(2010-2014) that contained some type of performance based incentive, broken down by 
team.  
 
Team Incentive Use 
Angles 60% 
Astros 27.3% 
A's 38.5% 
Blue Jays 5% 
Braves 46.7% 
Brewers 42.9% 
Cardinals 31.6% 
Cubs 48.3% 
Diamondbacks 17.4% 
Dodgers 44.1% 
Giants 43.5% 
Indians 40.9% 
Mariners 50% 
Marlins 37.5% 
Mets 41.7% 
Nationals 34.6% 
Orioles 47.8% 
Padres 22.2% 
Phillies 54.5% 
Pirates 27.3% 
Rangers 36.4% 
Rays 25% 
Red Sox 51.5% 
Reds 23.8% 
Rockies 33.3% 
Royals 47.1% 
Tigers 36.8% 
Twins 72.2% 
White Sox 47.6% 
Yankees 57.1% 
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Table 3: Incentive use by type and position 
This table shows the percentage of contracts containing the various incentive types, 
broken down by position. 
 
 Number Input 
Mean 
Output 
Mean 
Both 
Mean 
Total 
Mean 
Relief P 202 0.044554 0.128713 0.207921 0.381188 
Starting P 114 0.086957 0.307018 0.090476 0.508772 
Catcher 60 0.05 0.2 0.083333 0.333333 
First Base 36 0.111111 0.138889 0.027778 0.277778 
Second Base 40 0.075 0.25 0.025 0.35 
Third Base 41 0.04878 0.170732 0.073171 0.292683 
Shortstop 28 0.107143 0.214286 0.107143 0.428571 
Left Field 76 0.118421 0.184211 0.092105 0.394737 
Center Field 10 0 0.2 0 0.2 
Right Field 34 0.235294 0.176471 0.176471 0.588235 
Designated 
Hitter 
20 0 0.1 0.05 0.15 
All pitchers 316 0.060127 0.193038 0.174051 0.427215 
All hitters 345 0.092754 0.185507 0.078261 0.356522 
TOTAL 661 0.077039 0.188822 0.123867 0.389728 
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Table 4: Incentive use and contract terms 
This table presents the results of regressions on incentive usage, focused on the effects of 
total contract value and contract length. Controls are added for each of the thirty MLB 
teams, the five signing periods used in this dataset, player age at the time of signing, and 
positional controls for each of the positions (relief pitcher is the omitted position). The 
variable for contract value is reported in millions of dollars and the variable for contract 
length is reported in years. 
 
 
Incentive Use by Type: 
 Model 1: Value Model 2: Length 
 
All Output Input All Output Input 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Controls       
Team Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Positional Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Age -0.005 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 0.0003 -0.006 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
       
Value (Millions) 0.002
***
 0.003
***
 -0.001
**
 
   
 
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) 
   
Contract Length (years) 
   
0.034
**
 0.052
***
 -0.026
*
 
    
(0.016) (0.009) (0.013) 
Constant 0.677
***
 0.042 0.393
**
 0.666
***
 0.020 0.413
**
 
 
(0.236) (0.130) (0.195) (0.242) (0.135) (0.200) 
Observations 661 661 661 661 661 661 
R
2
 0.167 0.160 0.115 0.162 0.130 0.113 
Adjusted R
2
 0.106 0.099 0.050 0.101 0.066 0.048 
Residual Std. Error (df = 615) 0.462 0.254 0.382 0.463 0.258 0.382 
F Statistic (df = 45; 615) 2.735
***
 2.604
***
 1.780
***
 2.647
***
 2.036
***
 1.745
***
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Table 5: Incentive use and specialization (1) 
This table shows the effects of specialization on the use of incentives for hitters in the sample. Controls are 
added for each of the thirty MLB teams, the five signing periods used in this dataset, player age at the time 
of signing, and positional controls for each of the positions (catcher is the omitted position). A control is 
also added in this regression for total contract value, in order to separate out the effect of specialization 
from a player’s total productivity, which we assume is correlated with contract value. For the tracked 
performance statistics, measures of variances are also included in order to test for a correlation between the 
variability of a player’s performance and the use of incentives. The specialist score variable is computed by 
awarding a player a point for each season in which they rate in the top ten players at their position in home 
runs or finish in the top three percent of all players in stolen bases. Each time a player finishes in one of 
these categories they are awarded a point towards their specialist score, the total of which is reported as 
“TOT specialist score.”  
 
 
Incentive Use by Type: 
 
All Output Input 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Controls    
Team Controls YES YES YES 
Year Controls YES YES YES 
Position Controls YES YES YES 
Value 0.000 0.000
***
 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age -0.002 0.002 -0.004 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
Tracked Statistic Variance    
AB variance 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
HR variance -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 
 
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) 
SB variance -0.001
*
 0.0002 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
    
TOT specialist score 0.032
*
 0.013 0.014 
 
(0.018) (0.011) (0.016) 
Constant 0.412 0.111 0.341 
 
(0.340) (0.204) (0.295) 
Observations 345 345 345 
R
2
 0.255 0.265 0.145 
Adjusted R
2
 0.137 0.149 0.010 
Residual Std. Error (df = 297) 0.446 0.268 0.387 
F Statistic (df = 47; 297) 2.161
***
 2.284
***
 1.074 
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Table 6: Incentive use and specialization (2) 
This table shows the effects of specialization on the use of incentives for hitters in the sample. 
Controls are added for each of the thirty MLB teams, the five signing periods used in this dataset, 
player age at the time of signing, and positional controls for each of the positions (catcher is the 
omitted position). A control is also added in this regression for total contract value, in order to 
separate out the effect of specialization from a player’s total productivity, which we assume is 
correlated with contract value. For the tracked performance statistics, measures of variances are 
also included in order to test for a correlation between the variability of a player’s performance 
and the use of incentives. Specialist score variables are computed by awarding a player a point for 
each season in which they rate in the top ten players at their position in home runs or finish in the 
top three percent of all players in stolen bases. The “HR specialist score” represents the total 
score for the home run leaders, while “SB specialist score” represents the total score for the stolen 
base leaders. “TOT specialist score” is the sum of the two categories. 
 
 
Incentive Use by Type: 
 
All Output Input 
Controls 
   
Team Controls YES YES YES 
Year Controls YES YES YES 
Positional Controls YES YES YES 
Value 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age -0.001 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
Tracked Statistic Variance    
AB variance 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.0000) 
HR variance -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 
 
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) 
SB variance -0.001 0.001* -0.0005 
 
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) 
Specializations    
HR specialist score 0.039* 0.025** 0.018 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.018) 
SB specialist score 0.011 -0.023 0.003 
 
(0.037) (0.022) (0.032) 
Constant 0.382 0.060 0.325 
 
(0.343) (0.205) (0.298) 
Observations 345 345 345 
R2 0.256 0.274 0.146 
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.156 0.007 
Residual Std. Error (df = 296) 0.446 0.267 0.388 
F Statistic (df = 48; 296) 2.121*** 2.325*** 1.052 
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Table 7: Incentive use and specialization (3) 
This table shows the effects of specialization on the use of incentives for pitchers. Controls are added for 
each of the thirty MLB teams, the five signing periods used in this dataset, player age at the time of signing, 
and positional controls for each of the positions (relief pitcher is the omitted position). A control is also 
added in this regression for total contract value, in order to separate out the effect of specialization from a 
player’s total productivity, which we assume is correlated with contract value. For the tracked performance 
statistics, measures of variances are also included in order to test for a correlation between the variability of 
a player’s performance and the use of incentives. The relative statistics report Innings Pitched (IP) above 
average, Strike Outs (SO) above average, and ERA above average relative to a player’s positional peers. 
These variables are computed by taking the average of each statistic for both positions for a given season, 
subtracting this average from an individual player’s production of that statistic for that season, and then 
finally taking the mean of those differences over the three year period prior to signing the contract.  
 
 
Incentive Use by Type: 
 
All Output Input 
Controls    
Team Controls YES YES YES 
Year Controls YES YES YES 
Position Controls YES YES YES 
Age -0.017* -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
Value -0.000 0.000** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tracked Statistics Variance    
IP variance 0.00004 0.00002 0.00001 
 (0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00002) 
SO variance -0.00003 -0.00003 0.00004 
 (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.00004) 
ERA variance 0.0004 0.0003 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Relative Statistics    
IP above average -0.002 -0.002* -0.0001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
SO above average 0.005** 0.002* 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
ERA above average -0.070** -0.017 -0.003 
 
(0.032) (0.016) (0.025) 
Constant 1.220
*** 0.048 0.520* 
 
(0.356) (0.178) (0.279) 
Observations 316 316 316 
R2 0.222 0.162 0.251 
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.033 0.136 
Residual Std. Error (df = 273) 0.469 0.234 0.367 
F Statistic (df = 42; 273) 1.853*** 1.253 2.184*** 
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Table 8: Pitcher Characteristics and Contract Value 
This table shows the output of a regression on total contract value. Controls are added for 
each of the thirty MLB teams, the five signing periods used in this dataset, player age at 
the time of signing, and positional controls for each of the positions (relief pitcher is the 
omitted position). 
 
 
 
Total Contract Value: 
 
Value 
Controls 
 
Team Controls YES 
Year Controls YES 
Position Controls YES 
Age -910,869.300
***
 
 
(293,996.200) 
Tracked Statistics Variance  
IP variance 2,232.508
**
 
 (893.631) 
SO variance -5,626.473
***
 
 (1,623.889) 
ERA variance 359,800.100
***
 
 (78,358.900) 
Relative Statistics  
IP above average -226,156.200
***
 
 (61,959.730) 
SO above average 621,790.700
***
 
 (71,637.250) 
ERA above average -4,444,009.000
***
 
 
(1,007,930.000) 
Constant 40,961,364.000
***
 
 
(11,444,617.000) 
Observations 316 
R
2
 0.529 
Adjusted R
2
 0.459 
Residual Std. Error 15,430,959.000 (df = 274) 
F Statistic 7.511
***
 (df = 41; 274) 
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Table 9: Incentive use and player productivity 
This table shows the relationship between the productivity of a player, denoted by the 
player’s WAR in the previous season, and the existence of incentives in their free agent 
contract. Controls are added for each of the thirty MLB teams, the five signing periods 
used in this dataset, player age at the time of signing, and positional controls for each of 
the positions (relief pitcher is the omitted position). 
 
 
 
Incentive Use by Type: 
 
All Excellence Risk 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Controls 
   
Team Controls YES YES YES 
Year Controls YES YES YES 
Position Controls YES YES YES 
Age -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
    
Previous Season WAR 0.035
**
 0.031
***
 -0.005 
 
(0.014) (0.008) (0.012) 
    
Constant 0.754
***
 0.194 0.308 
 
(0.232) (0.132) (0.193) 
Observations 661 661 661 
R
2
 0.164 0.104 0.108 
Adjusted R
2
 0.103 0.038 0.043 
Residual Std. Error (df = 615) 0.462 0.262 0.383 
F Statistic (df = 45; 615) 2.685
***
 1.579
**
 1.655
***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
References: 
 
Baker, G. (1992). Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement. Journal of 
Political Economy, 100(3), 598–614. http://doi.org/10.1086/261831 
Barth, E., Bratsberg, B., Hægeland, T., & Raaum, O. (2008). Who pays for performance? 
International Journal of Manpower, 29(1), 8–29. 
http://doi.org/10.1108/01437720810861985 
Baseball Reference (2015). Baseball Reference Play Index. Retrieved October 2015, 
from http://www.baseball-reference.com/play-index/season_finder.cgi?type=b 
Baseball Prospectus (2015). Cot’s Baseball Contracts. Retrieved October 2015, from 
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/compensation/cots/ 
Dohmen, T., & Falk, A. (2011). Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: 
Productivity,Preferences,and Gender. American Economic Review, 101(April), 556–
590. 
ESPN (2015). 2015 MLB Free Agents. Retrieved October 2015, from 
http://espn.go.com/mlb/freeagents 
Fangraphs (2015). Fangraphs WAR leaders. Retrieved November 2015, from 
http://www.fangraphs.com/leaders.aspx?pos=all&stats=bat&lg=all&qual=y&type=6
&season=2015&month=0 
Gibbons, R. (1998). Incentives in Organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
12(4), 115–132. http://doi.org/10.1257/jep.12.4.115 
Gibbs, M. J., Merchant, K. a., Van Der Stede, W. a., & Vargus, M. E. (2009). 
Performance measure properties and incentive system design. Industrial Relations, 
48(2), 237–264. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-232X.2009.00556.x 
Gielen, A. C., Kerkhofs, M. J. M., & van Ours, J. C. (2010). How performance related 
pay affects productivity and employment. Journal of Population Economics, 23(1), 
291–301. http://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-009-0252-9 
Gneezy, U., Meier, S., & Rey-Biel, P. (2011). When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work 
to Modify Behavior. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(4), 191–210. 
http://doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.4.191 
Holmstrom, B., Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P., & Milgrom, P. (1994). The Firm as an 
Incentive System. The American Economic Review, 84(4), 972–991. 
http://doi.org/10.1126/science.151.3712.867-a 
50 
 
Jensen, C., & Meckling, H. (1976). THEORY OF THE FIRM : MANAGERIAL 
BEHAVIOR , AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE I . Journal of 
Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. 
Kauhanen, A., & Napari, S. (2012). Performance Measurement and Incentive Plans. 
Industrial Relations, 51(3), 645–669. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
232X.2012.00694.x 
Kauhanen, A., & Piekkola, H. (2006). What makes performance-related pay schemes 
work? Finnish evidence. Journal of Management and Governance, 10(2), 149–177. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-006-0005-z 
Kerr, S. (1975). On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B. The Academy of 
Management Journal, 18(4), 769–783. http://doi.org/10.2307/255378 
Lahman, S. (2015). Lahman’s Baseball Database 2014. Retrieved October 2015, from 
http://seanlahman.com/baseball-archive/statistics 
Lazear, E. P. (1995). Personnel economics. Wicksell Lectures. 
Lazear, E. P. (1998). Personnel economics for managers. New York; Chichester and 
Toronto. 
Lazear, E. P. (2000a). Performance pay and productivity. American Economic Review, 
90(5), 1346–1361. http://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.5.1346 
Lazear, E. P. (2000b). The Power of Incentives. American Economic Review, 90(2), 410–
414. http://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.410 
Major League Baseball Club Owners, Major League Baseball Players Association. 
(2007). "2007-2011 Basic Agreement."  
 
Major League Baseball Club Owners, Major League Baseball Players Association. 
(2012)  "2012-2016 Basic Agreement."  
 
Major League Baseball Club Owners. (1921). “Major League Constitution.”  
Posner, R. a. (2010). From the new institutional economics to organization economics: 
with applications to corporate governance, government agencies, and legal 
institutions. Journal of Institutional Economics (Vol. 6). 
http://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137409990270 
Prendergast, C. (2002). The tenuous trade-off between risk and incentives. Journal of 
Political Economy, 110(5), 1071–1102. http://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.421 
51 
 
Roberts, J. (2010). Designing incentives in organizations. Journal of Institutional 
Economics, 6(01), 125. http://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137409990221 
